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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the characteristics of firms that reported positive price 
movements during the 2008 crash. In the last decade, the stock market had two crashes; the first 
one occurred in year 2000 and the second one occurred in year 2008, where the stock market 
lost more than 50% of its value and shook the global economy. The study highlights the financial 
characteristics of those firms that reported positive price movements during the 2008 crash 
period, tests their significance, and attempts to explain their underlying reasons. The study 
employs both fundamental and market measures. In particular, we study if there is a significant 
difference between the financial structure of health sector and other sectors, and among the 
groups of firms within the health sector. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decade, investors were confronted with two traumatic experiences with the occurrence 
of two stock market crashes.  As a consequence, they lost more than 40% of their investments in 
the first crash (year 2000) and more than 50% of their investments in the second one (year 2008). 
These market crashes had devastating effects on all industries at all levels and shook the global 
economy (Nofsinger, 2001). During the same period, many firms reported positive price 
movements despite the negative factors that overwhelmed the financial market. In an effort to 
help investors to be better informed, the paper aims at examining the financial structure of these 
firms with a positive price movement by highlighting their unique characteristics and testing 
their significance.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Many studies discussed the causes of stock market crash and provided different explanations. 
Pattanaik (2009) argued that the deregulation of the global financial services industry is one of 
the main causes of the 2008 crash. Dell’Aricia et al. (2008) believed the longer-lasting boom 
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factor and the high inflation with the lower growth were among the main factors that resulted in 
the crisis. Demyanyk and Hemert (2008) highlighted the classic lending boom-bust scenario, 
where the fluctuation of the subprime mortgage market, along with the unsustainable growth in 
credit expansion had led to the collapse of the financial markets. Rogers (2008) underscored the 
effect of the rapid development of free market globalization following the economic recession 
after the financial crisis. He added that as a consequence, globalization produced two conflicting 
results; the first is a boost in the economic growth (benefit); the second is deepening the wealth-
poverty gap (detriment). Roll (1989) suggested that a crash occurs because of the revised 
expectations of the worldwide economic activity. Taylor (2009), however, referred the main 
cause of year 2008 crisis to the abundance of credit because of the unusually low interest rate 
policy set by the Federal Reserves (FEDS). Di-Martino et al (2007) gave emphasis to the fact 
that with the decline in the subprime market in late 2006, lending institutions began to anticipate 
the looming problems; they tightened their lending policies and businesses were not able to 
obtain loans to expand or even survive the weak economy.  
 
The study on the impact of crashes on stock return includes Roll (1988), King and Wadhwani 
(1990), Malliaris and Urrutia (1992), Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993), Meric and Meric (2000), 
Pan et al. (2001), Yang et al. (2003), Hon et al. (2004), Coudhry (2005), Fernandez (2008), 
Nikkinenet al. (2008). These studies mainly focus on the factors causing crashes and the 
volatility and co-movements of markets during and after crashes (Wang et al., 2009). However, 
the impact of crashes on stock return of companies from different industries has not drawn wide 
attention. In this paper, we attempt to investigate how the stock return from different industries 
reacts to the crisis in 2008. Wang et al. (2009) have studied similar problem for the crisis during 
1968 to 2007. In their paper, they study how a stock market crash affects individual stocks and 
whether stocks with different financial characteristics are affected differently. To determine if 
industry classification affected stock returns during crashes they use four industry dummy 
variables, which include consumer durables and non-durables industries, the business equipment, 
telephone, and television transmission industries, the manufacturing and energy industries, the 
healthcare, medical equipment, and pharmaceutical industries. They have found that the latter 
two industries do not appear to have been affected as severely as the former two industries in 
crashes. Moreover, they have shown that health industry stocks lost less value in that crash 
compared with stocks from other industries.  
 
Financial Performance 
 
In assessing firms’ financial performance, there is a wide variety of measures used. Allouche et 
al. (2008) used ROA, ROE, ROCE as well as the financial structure of 1,271 Japanese 
companies to test the firms’ performance. Similarly, the results of a study done by Onaolapo and 
Kojala (2010) showed evidence that a firm’s capital structure surrogated by debt ratio had a 
negative impact on the firm’s performance (ROA and ROE). Gompers et al. (2003) tested the 
relationship between corporate governance, equity returns, and the firm’s value using financial 
measures along with other non-financial measures. They concluded that corporate governance is 
positively correlated with equity returns and firm’s values. Berger and Ofek (1995), in a study 
about the firms’ performance, found a positive correlation between return on assets (ROA) and 
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return on capital employed (ROCE). Dastgir and Velashani (2008) found that comprehensive 
income is a good measure of a firm’s performance.  
 
Bettis and Hall (1982), Densetz and Lehn (1985), Habib and Victor (1991), Gorton and Rosen 
(1995), Mehran (1995), Ang, Cole and Line (2000), Margaritis and Psillaki (2006), Rao et al 
(2007), Zeitun and Tian (2007) used ROA and ROE as performance proxies in their studies. 
Dastgir and Velashani (2008) reported that Earnings Per Share (EPS) is positively correlated 
with a firm’s performance and argued that EPS is also a measure of shareholder value. 
 
Additionally, some firm characteristics are significant determinants for stock performance in 
crashes. Fama and French (1992, 1993) have shown that size and the book-to-market ratio are 
significant proxies for risk in order to help explain asset returns in addition to CAMP beta. Fama 
and French (1992, 1993), Xu and Malkiel (2003) and Angelidis and Tessaromatis (2008) suggest 
that company specific idiosyncratic risk factors can become significant determinants of capital 
asset prices during stock market crashes that cause sudden changes in volatility. Amihud (1990) 
demonstrates that the decline in liquidity contributed significantly to the decline in stock prices 
in the 1987 stock market crash. Wang et al. (2009) have included the variables such as Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) beta, size, market-to-book ratio, and short/long term debt, cash-
flow, profitability, and liquidity ratios and have shown that certain firm characteristics are 
significant determinants for stock performance in some crashes while they are not in other 
crashes.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the uniqueness of the financial structure of the health 
sector firms during the crash period of year 2008.  The study tests if there is a significant 
difference between the financial structure of health sector and other sectors, and among the 
groups of firms within the health sector.  
 
Research Methodology  
The study examines the financial structure of health sector and studies the differences between 
the public-listed firms in the health sector and those of other economic sectors.  Analysts, 
practitioners and academicians used financial ratios in assessing stock returns in financial 
markets. This study uses a combination of accounting measures and market measures, which are 
return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), price earnings (P/E), and price/book value 
(P/BV). 
 
The firms in our study are first divided into two groups; the first group consists of firms that 
reported positive price movements (PPM) during the 2008 crash period; the second group is 
made of firms that reported negative price movements (NPM) during the same period.  Public 
firms of both groups are then divided into the following nine sub-groups based on the type of the 
economic sector: (1) Consumer Discretionary, (2) Consumer Staples, (3) Energy, (4) Financial, 
(5) Health Care, (6) Industry, (7) Information Technology, (8) Material, and (9) Others (includes 
Transportation, Utilities, and Tele-Communication Services). Next, health sector firms of both 
groups are divided into the following eleven sub-groups based on the type of health services they 
provide: (1) Health Insurance, (2) Biotechnology, (3) Health Care Distributors, (4) Health Care 
Equipment, (5) Health Care Facilities, (6) Health Care Services, (7) Health Care Supplies, (8) 
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Health Care Technology, (9) Life Science Tools, (10) Managed Health Care, and (11) 
Pharmaceuticals.  First, the financial measures of all sectors are then summarized and their mean 
and standard deviation computed.  The significance of the difference of the financial measures of 
among PPM firms and NPM firms is then tested using controlled experiments across the various 
sectors at 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.  Then, we apply the same methodology to the 
subgroups within health care sector. Similarly, the financial measures are summarized; their 
means and standard deviations are computed; and the significance of the difference of the 
financial measures of among PPM firms and NPM firms is tested. 
 
The data used is a secondary type and is taken from Compustat. The original number of firms 
listed is 9,859, after extreme outliers were removed from the study, the number of firms that 
remained in the study is 9,344. "Outliers" are defined as those firms with an ROA less than -
100% and a ROE less than -200%. As the initial analysis to capture the price movement during 
the 2008 downturn, data of these companies were taken from two time frames i.e. January 01, 
2008 and December 31, 2008. 
     
Data Analysis 
 
Performances by Sector 
 
Out of a total of 9,344 firms in the nine economic sectors under our study, financial (31.5%), 
consumer discretionary (15.6%), information technology (14.4%), and health care (9.8%) 
constitute the four largest economic sectors (see Table 1). As Table 1 depicts, and as expected 
during the financial crisis of 2008, majority (87-93%) of firms in these economic sectors showed 
negative stock price movements during the period under study.  
 
 
Table 1- Number and Percentage of PPM and NPM 
 
Sector PPM (+) NPM (-) Total 
 # of 
firms 
Percent
age 
# of 
firms 
Percent
age 
# of firms Percenta
ge 
Consumer Discretionary 172 11.8 1283 88.2 1455 15.6 
Consumer Staples 42 10.7 352 89.3 394 4.2 
Energy 41 7.9 480 92.1 521 5.6 
Financial 248 8.4 2696 91.6 2944 31.5 
Health Care 107 11.7 808 88.3 915 9.8 
Industry 101 11.7 763 88.3 864 9.2 
Information Technology 113 8.4 1230 91.6 1343 14.4 
Material 61 12.1 444 87.9 505 5.4 
Others 30 7.4 373 92.6 403 4.3 
Overall 915 9.8 8,429 90.2 9344 100.0 
*For the following tables, ‘+’ represents PPM and ‘-’ represents NPM.  
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Testing the significance of the difference between stocks with PPM and NPM among the nine 
economic sectors is conducted at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance. Table 2 reflects the 
mean values for the two groups of firms across the nine economic sectors, using four measures -- 
P/E, price/book value, ROA, and ROE, and Table 3 shows the corresponding values for standard 
deviation for the two groups of firms across all the economic sectors, again using the same four 
measures.      
 
 
Table 2 –Performance measured by Mean  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector P/E Price/ BV ROA ROE 
 + - + - + - + - 
Consumer Discretionary 29 24 5 1 174 -213 3 -19 
Consumer Staples 23 22 3 2 5 -4 12 2 
Energy 32 35 4 3 5 0 5 -1 
Financial 23 31 2 1 3 0 11 4 
Health Care 31 40 4 1 -9 -18 -12 -67 
Industry 25 39 2 39 3 3 8 12 
Information Technology 84 41 4 1 13 4 -38 -4 
Material 20 25 4 4 0 1 -1 0 
Others 20 41 2 1 5 0 15 8 
Overall 26 33 7 1 32 -36 3 -8 
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Table 3 – Riskiness measured by Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
The results from testing the differences between the means of the four measures (i.e., P/E, P/BV, 
ROA, and ROE) of the two groups among the economic sectors are summarized in Table 4. The 
testing is done using Z distribution of comparing the means. The three critical values of two-tail-
test at three levels of significance are Z = + 2.58, that is very strong evidence (Alpha = 1%); Z = 
+ 1.962, that is strong evidence (Alpha = 5%); and Z = + 1.65, that is significant evidence (Alpha 
= 10%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector P/E Price/ BV ROA ROE 
 + - + - + - + - 
Consumer Discretionary 25 20 23 14 1932 3587 53 399 
Consumer Staples 13 14 3 4 19 21 85 102 
Energy 40 78 7 29 30 27 37 63 
Financial 42 90 1 2 8 9 13 48 
Health Care 42 79 44 23 29 36 43 652 
Industry 125 133 5 133 9 15 37 41 
Information Technology 84 71 8 20 135 196 76 104 
Material 16 52 10 75 18 45 38 50 
Others 9 140 1 24 4 15 13 38 
Overall 34 86 97 25 820 1480 36 280 
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Table 4 – The difference of the Mean between PPM and NPM measured by Z test 
 
Economic Sector Market Measures Fundamental Measures 
 P/E P/BV ROA ROE 
Consumer Discretionary 2.65*** 2.18** 2.18** 1.83* 
Consumer Staples 0.22 2.83*** 2.96*** 0.67 
Energy -0.34 0.65 1.04 0.85 
Financial -2.66*** 9.34*** 4.41*** 5.78*** 
Health Care -1.84* 0.69 2.93*** 2.36** 
Industry -1.04 1.79* 0.61 -0.96 
Information Technology 5.21*** 3.84*** 0.62 -4.39*** 
Material -1.65* -0.10 -0.42 -0.15 
Others -2.84*** 0.90 4.97*** 2.10** 
Overall  -4.80*** 1.76* 2.16** 3.56*** 
Note: *** alpha = 0.01 (very strong evidence), ** alpha = 0.05 (strong evidence), * alpha  = 0.10 (significant evidence) 
 
 
The results show that when comparing the mean using P/E measure, healthcare shows a 
"significant evidence" of difference between the two groups of firms, though not as strong as 
sectors such as Information technology, consumer discretionary, and financial.  The test statistic 
of the overall sector shows that the difference between the two groups is extremely strong with a 
value equal to -4.80.  In terms of the P/BV's means of the two groups, however, the health care 
sector does not exhibit any significant difference, though the test statistic for the overall sector is 
statistically different with a Z value of +1.76.  In terms of the ROA's mean, health care, along 
with financial, consumer staples, and "others" are among the sectors that demonstrate "very 
strong evidence" of significant difference between the two groups of firms, the overall sectors 
show a "strong evidence" of statistical difference with a Z value of +2.16.   Finally, looking at 
the means of return on equity ratio (ROE), health care exhibits "strong evidence" of significant 
difference between the two groups, whereas the ROE's means for the two groups in the overall 
sector show a "very strong evidence" of statistical difference with a Z value of +3.56.  
 
By employing four measures (i.e. P/E, P/BV, ROE, and ROA), our results show evidence that 
means between firms with positive price movements and those with negative price movements 
are indeed significantly different across several economic sectors (see Table 4).  Health sector, in 
particular, shows a very strong statistical difference between these two groups of firms especially 
when using the fundamental measures such as ROA or ROE.  
 
Using ROA to compare the means, firms in the health sector that showed negative price 
movements not only performed worse than their counterparts in most economic sectors (except 
for consumer discretionary), those that showed positive price movements actually performed the 
worst among firms in this category across all economic sectors (see Table 2).  Using the ROE's 
measure, firms in the health sector that showed negative price movements not only performed 
the worst but also had the highest risk among firms in this category across all economic sectors. 
Likewise, firms in the health sector that showed positive price movements also performed worse 
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than their counterparts in most economic sectors (except for information technology) (see Table 
3).  What caused the phenomenal under-performance and high level of riskiness of the health 
sector as compared to other economic sectors during the financial crisis of 2008?   
 
Performances within Health Sector 
 
We will now focus on the analysis of the eleven types of services in the health sector.  Firms in 
the health sector makes up 9.8% of the total 9,344 firms in the nine economic sectors (see Table 
1). Out of a total of 915 firms in the health sector, approximately 88% of them show negative 
price movements during the period under study as compared to only 12% showing positive price 
movements during the same period.  Out of the eleven service types, the three largest ones, 
namely Biotechnology (26%), Health Care Equipment (20.1%), and Pharmaceuticals (16.2%) 
make up more than 60% of the health care firms under study (see Table 5).   
 
Table 5 - Health Sector: Number and Percentage of PPM and NPM 
 
Health Sector PPM (+) NPM (-) Total 
 # of 
firms 
Percenta
ge 
# of 
firms  
Percenta
ge 
# of 
firms 
Percenta
ge 
Life & Health Insurance 3 8.1 34 91.9 37 4.0 
Biotechnology 31 13.0 207 87.0 238 26.0 
Health Care Distributors  4 14.3 24 85.7 28 3.1 
Health Care Equipment 25 13.6 159 86.4 184 20.1 
Health Care Facilities 5 8.3 55 91.7 60 6.6 
Health Care Services 9 11.4 70 88.6 79 8.6 
Health care Supplies 3 6.4 44 93.6 47 5.1 
Health Care Technology 4 11.1 32 88.9 36 3.9 
Life Science Tools 8 11.1 64 88.9 72 7.9 
Managed Health Care 2 8.7 21 91.3 23 2.5 
Pharmaceuticals 16 10.8 132 89.2 148 16.2 
Health Industry 107 11.7 808 88.3 915 100.0 
 
 
Using the same techniques as discussed in the previous section, the testing of the significance of 
the difference between stocks with PPM and NPM among the eleven types of services in the 
health sector is conducted at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance. Table 6 and Table 7 show 
the mean values and standard deviations respectively for the two groups of firms across the 
eleven types of services within the health sector, using the same four measures (P/E, price/book 
value, ROA, ROE) as before.   
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Table 6 - Health Sector: Performance measured by Mean 
 
 
 
Table 7 - Health Sector: Riskiness measured by Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
Applying the same methodology of comparing the means and using the same critical values of 
the two-tail-test at three levels of significance as in the previous section, the results from testing 
the differences between the means of the four measures (i.e., P/E, P/BV, ROA, and ROE) of the 
two groups among various firms in the health sector is summarized in Table 8.   
 
Activities P/E Price/ BV ROA ROE 
 + - + - + - + - 
Life & Health Insurance 20 24 3 2 2 1 8 10 
Biotechnology 26 24 -2 2 -20 -37 -29 -219 
Health Care Distributors  23 28 3 8 5 -4 13 -6 
Health Care Equipment 51 76 6 2 -7 -13 -10 -26 
Health Care Facilities 14 23 1 1 -1 0 -2 9 
Health Care Services 23 28 4 2 8 -1 13 21 
Health care Supplies 24 33 13 2 -25 -2 -36 -3 
Health Care Technology 21 55 8 0 13 -8 19 6 
Life Science Tools 34 43 7 1 -20 -14 -24 -20 
Managed Health Care 13 18 2 1 3 2 4 11 
Pharmaceuticals 23 28 6 -2 -10 -21 -13 -41 
Health Industry 31 40 4 1 -9 -18 -12 -67 
Stock Market 26 33 7 1 32 -36 3 -8 
Activities P/E Price/ BV ROA ROE 
 + - + - + - + - 
Life & Health Insurance 6 27 1 17 1 1 4 7 
Biotechnology 21 27 85 17 34 49 59 1280 
Health Care Distributors  11 21 2 26 7 21 21 46 
Health Care Equipment 79 155 7 6 25 27 38 76 
Health Care Facilities 0 15 1 1 6 15 14 34 
Health Care Services 7 17 3 4 8 18 11 92 
Health care Supplies 5 40 13 2 39 25 46 39 
Health Care Technology 2 39 5 6 13 32 19 108 
Life Science Tools 10 31 4 5 38 25 43 42 
Managed Health Care 3 5 1 1 5 12 12 16 
Pharmaceuticals 18 29 7 49 34 36 43 100 
Health Industry 42 79 44 23 29 36 43 652 
Stock Market  34 86 97 25 820 1480 36 280 
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Table 8 - Health Sector: The difference of the Mean between PPM and NPM measured by 
Z test 
 
Note: *** alpha = 0.01 (very strong evidence), ** alpha = 0.05 (strong evidence), * alpha  = 0.10 (significant evidence) 
 
The results show that when using the P/E measure to compare the means, Health Care 
Technology and Health Care Facilities are among those that show "very strong" significant 
difference (i.e., at 1% level) between the two groups of firms, follows by Managed Health Care 
at 5% significance level, and Life Science services, at 10% level (see Table 8).  Using the  
price/book value measure, Life Science Tool, Health Care Technology, and Health Care 
Equipment are among the services that yield "very strong" statistical difference between the two 
groups, follows by Health Care Services and Pharmaceuticals at 10% significance level.  
Looking at the ROA measure, Life Science Tools, and Health Care Services yield "very strong" 
statistical difference between the two groups of firms, follows by Health Care Technology, and 
Biotechnology with "strong" statistical difference at 5% significance level.  Finally, comparing 
the means using the ROE measure, Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals exhibit statistical 
difference at 5% significance level, with Health Care Equipment showing significant difference 
at 10% level.     
 
On closer examination of various firm types in the health sector, Health Care Technology and 
Life Science Tools in particular, show very strong statistically different results from other firm 
types, especially when comparing their means using the measures of P/E, Price/Book Value, and 
ROA (see Table 8). In this regards, four other firm types also stand out, namely Biotechnology 
(using ROA and ROE), Health Care Equipment (using P/BV and ROE), Health Care Services 
(using ROA and P/BV), Pharmaceuticals (using P/BV and ROE).   
 
We will now examine the performance and riskiness of the health sector by service type. It is 
interesting to note that almost all types of firms with positive price movements had better 
fundamental measures (i.e., ROA, and ROE) than those with the negative price movements 
(Table 6).  This is true when using the ROA measure, 8 out of 11 firm types conformed to this 
pattern, with the clear exception of Life Science Tools and Health Care Supplies.  When using 
Health Activities Market Measures Fundamental Measures 
 P/E P/BV ROA ROE 
Life & Health Insurance -0.69 0.34 1.63 -0.77 
Biotechnology 0.47 -0.26 2.43** 2.12** 
Health Care Distributors  -0.72 -0.93 1.63 1.35 
Health Care Equipment -1.24 2.71*** 1.10 1.65* 
Health Care Facilities -4.45*** 0.00 -0.30 -1.42 
Health Care Services -1.62 1.80* 2.63*** -0.69 
Health care Supplies -1.35 1.46 -1.01 -1.21 
Health Care Technology -4.88*** 2.95*** 2.44** 0.61 
Life Science Tools -1.72* 3.88*** -4.44*** -0.25 
Managed Health Care -2.10** 1.35 0.23 -0.76 
Pharmaceuticals -0.97 1.74* 1.21 2.02** 
Health Industry -1.83* 0.69 2.93*** 2.36** 
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ROA's measure, however, only 5 out of 11 firm types conformed to this pattern, again with the 
exception of Life Science Tools, Health Care Supplies, and a few others.  All the six sub-groups 
(Health Care Technology, Life Science Tools, Biotechnology, Health Care Equipment, Health 
Care Services, and Pharmaceuticals) that showed strong statistical difference between means of 
two types of firms using various measures also conformed to this pattern (except for Life Science 
Tools).  When using fundamental measures, both Life Science Tools and Health Care Supplies 
seem to stand out as contradictory sub-groups, their firms that showed positive movements 
performed worse than their firms with negative price movements, and the former actually 
showed higher risk than the latter firms (see Table 7).  In addition, firms with positive price 
movement had lower P/E ratio than those with negative price movement; their performance was 
certainly contradictory to the market expectations.   
 
Table 7 further reflects the standard deviation (i.e. riskiness) of the four measures by firm type in 
the health sector.  Regardless of the activity type or measure, as expected, riskier firms (firms 
with larger values of standard deviations) had negative price movements and less risky firms 
(firms with lower values of standard deviations) had positive price movements most of the time.  
This is certainly true with firms among the six sub-groups (Health Care Technology, Life 
Science Tools, Biotechnology, Health Care Equipment, Health Care Services, and 
Pharmaceuticals) mentioned earlier, again with the exception of Life Science Tools.   
 
In addition, using fundamental measures, Biotechnology, Health Care Technology, and 
Pharmaceuticals particularly stand out as sub-groups that had higher risk than the rest of the 
health industry.  Interestingly, majority of these firm types fall into a sub-sector in the health 
industry typically known as Biopharmaceuticals (BP for short).  According to Lazonick and 
Tulum (2011), the growth of the BP industry up to the point of 2008 financial crisis has been 
unsustainable due to two reasons: (1) the willingness of stock market investors to absorb the 
initial public offerings (IPOs) of such BP venture even before a commercial product is generated, 
if at all; (2) the research support of such industry has been heavily funded and subsidized by the 
U.S. governments than from business finance.  While it is true that speculators in the stock 
market bet on the movement of a BP stock based on news relating to R&D contracts and clinical 
trials (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 2007), a few US regulations (particularly the Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980, and the Orphan Drug Act of 1983) also served to encourage new ventures in biotech 
(e.g. R&D alliances in biotechnology), and facilitate knowledge transfer through federally 
funded research, have indeed fueled the creation and growth of new technology firms (Mowery 
et al., 2004).  In addition, due to the sizable funding from National Institute of Health (NIH) (e.g. 
$30.9 billion in 2010) and the Federal subsidies through the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983, 
several leading biotech companies have achieved significant growth through the development 
and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs with orphan status (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011l; 
Lazonick, 2011).  Unfortunately, such government subsidies and government funded knowledge 
base (through NIH), and patent protection provided by ODA, will continue to entice the venture 
capitalists to invest in an industry marked by unusually long product development cycles with 
highly uncertain prospects for commercial success.  Furthermore, especially in the past decade, 
in order to boost stock prices, the executives of U.S. business corporations, BP industries 
included, encouraged by Wall Street, have become increasingly involved in the practice of 
allocating substantial corporate resources to buy back their own corporate stocks  (Lazonick, 
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2010, Ch 6).  The pharmaceutical industry has been opposing Congressional regulation of drug 
prices on the ground that high prices fund R& D expenditure.  Yet between 1997 and 2010, 
leading BP companies such as Amgen repurchased their own stocks with values equal to 103% 
of R&D expenditure, Pfizer 64%, Johnson and Johnson 56%, and Merck 53% (Lazonick, 2011).  
Between 2000 and 2009, three of the largest Managed Health Care were among the top 50 stock 
re-purchasers in the U.S. --  UnitedHealth Group (#24) with $25.2 billion in buybacks (96% of 
net income), Wellpoint (#39) with $17.5 billion (2%), and Aetna (#49) with $10.4 billion 
(125%).  Until the financial crisis of 2008, such business model brought in sizable funds to BP 
industry through venture capital, R&D alliances, and issuing of public equities despite the 
overall unprofitable drug development (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).  However, the question 
remains whether the current business model of BP industry is sustainable enough to survive 
another future financial crash.        
 
Conclusions 
 
Although many studies discussed the causes of stock market crash and provided different 
explanations, the role of stock and firm financial characteristics in explaining the 
impact of crashes on individual stock returns has not received much attention.  Inspired by the 
study by Wang et al. (2009), we attempt to investigate how the stocks return from different 
industries react to the crisis in 2008. We found that firms in the health sector not only performed 
the worst but also had the highest risk among firms in this category across all economic sectors.  
After a closer look at the health care sector, we found that almost all types of firms with 
positive price movements had better fundamental measures except for Life Science Tools and 
Health Care Supplies. In these two subgroups, their firms that showed positive movements 
performed worse than their firms with negative price movements, and the former actually 
showed higher risk than the latter firms. 
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